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NOTES
THE NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION STATUTES AND
THE CO-EMPLOYEE SUIT
Is it in the better interest of the worker to be protected from
his fellow employee or from himself: Workmen's compensation
legislation customarily prevents a common law suit by an injured
employee against his employer.' When this immunity is extended
to the employee whose negligence has caused the injury of his
fellow servant, the negligent employee has been protected from
the consequences of his negligence. When this is not done, an em-
ployee, if injured, has a more complete recovery available to him
than is customarily given by a workmen's compensation award.2
On the other hand, the negligent employee faces the possibility of
a damage judgment which he can ill afford to pay. In weighing
the desirability of affording complete compensation to the injured
employee against the possibility of harm to the negligent worker
and those who are dependent on him within the context of work-
men's compensation laws, various courts and legislatures have
arrived at different results.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the North Dakota
law bearing on this point and to attempt to discover what solution
North Dakota has adopted or should adopt in order to best apply
the policy behind workmen's compensation.
THE NORTH DAKOTA STATUTES
In common with the outline followed by most states, North
Dakota has two statutory provisions which bear most directly on
the issue of the co-employee suit. The first is the section which
grants immunity from common law suit to the employer. The
second is the section which provides for suit by an injured employee
against a third party.4 Whether a co-employee may be sued in
North Dakota can be answered by an attempt to determine under
which of these two statutes he appears to fit. The result of this
inquiry, however, is not entirely clear-cut.
1. E.g., N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960).
2. The proportion of the Injury burden not distributed over the industry, and there-
fore borne by the injured worker, varies from state to state, but it has been estimated
at 60%. HOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (hereinafter cited as
HosoviTz, TRENDS) 469 & n. 20.
3. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960).
4. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (1960),
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At first glance, the section which prevents a suit against an
employer 5 would appear to extend its protection to the fellow
servant of an injured worker by providing that an employee has no
right of action against an employer "or against any agent, servant,
or other employee of such employer. ' 6 However the history of
this section of the workmen's compensation law suggests that another
interpretation might be possible.
Prior to 1951, the above-quoted language did not appear in the
North Dakota statute.7 Presumably, suit against a co-employee
could have been brought until that date. 8 In 1951, the language
concerning the right against "any agent, servant or other employee"
was added by an amendment written by the Legislative Research
Committee.9 The Committee's purpose, which is as close to legis-
lative intent as it is possible to come, is set out in the Legislative
Research Committee Report:
Introduced at the request of the Workman's Compen-
sation Bureau. To clarify the law regarding the liability of
covered employees, and to insert a specific provision in
section 65-0108 stating such injured employees "shall look
solely to the fund for compensation." This would prevent
an employee who has collected compensation from the North
Dakota Fund from collecting the difference between the
benefits allowed by the North Dakota law and possible higher
benefits under another state law.10
The focus of the Committee, and through them, the legislature,
appears to be on a prevention of the possibility of successful recovery
in North Dakota followed by recovery in another state. An intent
to eliminate the common law right of one employee to sue another
does not appear in the Committee's report.
Why then, was the language which seems to do so included in
the change made in 1951? A perusal of two cases decided in the
United States Supreme Court" and a subsequent Minnesota case,
1 2
decided in 1950, the latter of which construed the North Dakota
workmen's compensation statutes provide a fairly clear answer.
In the first Supreme Court case, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt,13 an employee of a Louisiana company was injured in Texas.
5. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960).
6. At least one judge from another state appears to have so Interpreted it. Marquez
v. Rapid Harvest Co.,-Ariz.-, 405 P.2d 814, 824 & n. 6 (1965) (dissent).
7. See LAWS o N. D. 1919, ch. 162, § 6. (See also N. D. REv. CODE of 1943 § 65-01-08).
8. There have been no reported cases of a suit against a co-employee having been
brought in North Dakota. However, in the absence of some statutory Indication to the
contrary, such suits are usually allowed. Ransom v. Haner, 174 F. Supp. 82 (Alaska 1959) ;
Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962). But see Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass.
593, 190 N.E. 815 (1934).
9. LAWS OF N. D. 1951, 518.
10. REPORTs, LEGISLATrVE RESEARCH COMM. 1946-1953, 43 (1951 Report).
11. IndustrIal Comm'n. of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) ; Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943)..
12. Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Const. Co., 23 Minn. 433, 43 N.W.2d. 792 (1950).
13. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
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He first recovered under the workmen's compensation law of Texas,
and then sought to recover for the same injury in Louisiana. The
Court held that since the Texas statutes prevented double recovery,
the "full faith and credit clause"' 4 required the Louisiana court to
deny the second recovery. Prior to the Magnolia decision, the state
courts which had decided the question had usually held that an
award under the laws of another state would not bar a recovery
under the local law, although the claimant was required to deduct
the amount of the first award from the second.
15
Four years after the Magnolia decision, the Supreme Court
heard the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin.16 This
case involved an attempt to recover workmen's compensation bene-
fits in Wisconsin subsequent to a successful claim for the same injury
in Illinois. The Wisconsin court denied recovery in the second claim"
on the authority of Magnolia. In reversing the Wisconsin court, the
Supreme Court distinguished the cases at least partially18 on the
basis that the Illinois law, as opposed to the Texas law, did not
prevent additional recovery in another state.19
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge
Construction Co., 2 0 decided in 1950, held that, because the wording
of the North Dakota workmen's compensation statutes did not ex-
pressly eliminate the possibility of a second recovery under the
statutes of another state, the McCartin, rather than the Magnolia rule
applied to allow compensation when a workman claimed a work-
men's compensation award in Minnesota after he had recovered
under the North Dakota statutes. In the course of the decision, the
Minnesota court quotes2' two portions of the Texas workmen's com-
pensation statutes. One portion22 prevents a suit against a co-
employee in Texas 23 while the other2 4 prevents a subsequent recov-
ery in Texas after a recovery has been granted in another state25
and forms the basis of the Magnolia-McCartin distinction.
2
14. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
15. E.g., Salvation Army v. Industrial Comm'n., 219 Wis. 343, 263 N.W. 349 (1935)
McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N.E, 338 (1931) ; 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAW 358 (1952).
16. 330 U.S. 430 (1943).
17. McCartin v. Industrial Comm'n. 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522 (1946).
16. There was also an agreement in the Illinois award that nothinz therein should
affect the claiment's rights under Wisconsin law. Industrial Comm'n. of Wis. v. McCartin,
supra note 11, at 624.
19. "If it were apparent that the Illinois award was intended to be final and conclu-
sive of all the employee's rights against the employer and the insurer growing out of the
injury, the decision In the Mannolia Petroleum Co. case would be controlling here." Id.,
at 626 . . . "But there is nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to indicate
that it is completely exclusive, that it is designed to preclude any recovery by proceedings
brought in another state for injuries received there in the course of an Illinois employ-
ment." Id.. at 627, 628.
20. Supra note 12.
21. Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Const. Co.. supra note 12, at 794.
22. TEx. CrvIL STATS. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (1956).
23. Y=aynes v. Taylor, 35 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1931), rehearing denied, 38 S.W.2d 1101
(Tex. 1931). Cf., McKelvey v. Barber. 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1964).
24. TEx. CrvmL STATS. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (1956).
25. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cason, 132 Tex. 393, 124 S.W.2d 321 (1939).
26. What Is required by the Magnolia rule is "some unmistakable language by a state
legislature" that it wishes to eliminate the subsequent recovery. See Cook v. Minneapolis
Bridge Const. Co., supra note 12, at 796, quoting Industrial Comm'n. of Wis., supra note
11. It would not appear that the co-employee suit must also be eliminated to come under
the Magnolia rule.
The proximity in time of the change in the North Dakota statute
to the Cook case, plus the wording of the Legislative Research
Committee's report indicates that the purpose of the legislature
was to remove the basis for the Cook decision and make the Magnolia
rule applicable to North Dakota. The same bill also amended another
section of the workmen's compensation chapter 27 to provide that
the decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau shall be final
judgments and therefore entitled to be given "the same full faith
and credit as a judgment of a court of record. ' 28 Since the full
faith and credit clause2 9 forms the basis for the Magnolia rule,
this is still more indication that the legislative intent was to meet
the requirements for coming under the rule.
While the heading of a statute is not law in North Dakota,30 it
is at least an indication of what the section purports to do. Since
the legislature made no mention in the heading of the right of an
employee to sue his negligent fellow at the time of the amendment,'
1
it may be possible to draw a weak inference that the statute does
not purport to deal with that question.
It is possible, although admittedly not necessary, to conclude
that this section of the statute3 2 was not intended to prevent a co-
employee suit. In fact, the North Dakota Supreme Court said in 1953,
"There is no provision anywhere in our statute to indicate that an
employee was deprived of his common law rights to a suit for
damages against anyone except his own employer." s
Isolated from the section considered above, 34 the North Dakota
section on liability of third persons 5 would probably have included
a co-employee among those whom the injured employee was allowed
to sue. North Dakota's original workmen's compensation statutes
were derived from those of Ohio.36 A 1927 Ohio decision held that
their statute prevented the suit against a co-employee.37 However,
this rule was later reversed s and the Ohio statutes did not prevent
such a suit until an amendment, effective in 1963, apparently did
so. 89 By the majority of decisions, the right to sue a co-employee
is included in the statute which provides for suit against third
27. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-03 (1960).
28. LAws OF N. D. 1951, 518.
29. Supra note 14.
30. N. D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-12 (1960).
31. "65-0108. CONTRIBUTING EMPLOYER RELIEVED FROM LIABILITY FOR
INJURY TO EMPLOYEE." Note 28, supra.
32. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960)
33. State v. Wylie Co., 79 N.D. 471, 484, 58 N.W.2d 76, 83 (1953). Since the case in-
volved 1949 facts, the pronouncement may or may not reflect the opinion of the court in
view of the 1951 amendment. However, this case has been cited for the proposition that
a co-employee may be sued. Text, 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, Op. cit.
supra note 15, at 171 and n. 7 at 172 (1965 Supp.).
34. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960).
35. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (1960).
36. State ex rel. Dushek v. Watland, 51 N.D. 710, 201 N.W. 680 (1924).
37. Landrum v. Middaugh, 117 Ohio St. 608, 160 N.E. 691 (1927).
38. See Gee v. Horvath, 169 Ohio St. 14, 157 N.E.2d 354 (1959) ; Ellis v. Garwood, 168
Ohio St. 241, 152 N.E.2d 100 (1958).
39. OHIo Rsv. CODE ANN. § 4123.741 (Baldwin 1964).
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parties, absent a contrary indication in the statute.4 0 This contrary
indication is customarily found within the third party statute.4
1
Although some courts have refused to allow a co-employee suit to
come under such statutes,42 the language of the North Dakota
Supreme Court, quoted above 4 3 is fairly conclusive that at least
prior to 1951, the third party statute44 would have included the
co-employee suit.
This section was also amended in 1951, although not by the
same bill that changed the section dealing with the immunity of the
employer. The amendment to the third party action section 5 did
not include any change which prevents its operation on co-employee
actions. If the legislature had had an intent to prevent the co-
employee suit, it would seem reasonable that they would have made
such a change in the section under which such suits are normally
brought.
46
What is the effect upon the third party action statute of the
words "or against any agent, servant, or other employee" now
contained in the statute relating to the immunity of the employer?
Such language in Texas, from which the wording appears to have
come, prevents a co-employee suit.' 7 Assuming that the legislature
did not have the intent to prevent such a suit in North Dakota, will
the courts nevertheless be required by that language to preclude
the suit?
A number of arguments are available to a court inclined to adopt
them which would allow an injured employee to sue his negligent
fellow servant in North Dakota. As the two statutory provisions
appear to conflict, the court could say that the clause appearing
later in point of position will govern. 8 The court could say that
statutes must show a clear intent to remove a common law right
before they will be construed to do so.' 9 Since the intent of the
legislature on the point of the co-employee suit is uncertain, the
statutes might not meet this test. Finally, the best argument, which
has already been accepted by the North Dakota Supreme Court
in an analogous situation, is:
t . . it is perfectly clear that if the literal import of
the words is not consistent with legislative intent . . . the
40. Supra note 8. See also Tulley v. Gardner's Estate, 196 Kan. 137, 409 P.2d 782 (1966).
41. E.g., such statutes restrict the third-party action to "some person other than the
employer". IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-204 (1949).
42. Breshnahan v. Barre, supra note 8; Majors v. Moneymaker, 196 Tenn. 698, 270
S.W.2d 328 (1954).
43. Supra note 33.
44. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (1960).
45. Laws of N. D. 1951, 520.
46. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 72.00, 72.20 (1952).
47. Supra note 23.
48. N. D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-08 (1960).
49. Martin v. Theockary, 220 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Marquez v. Rapid Harvest Co.,
-Ariz.--, 405 P.2d 814 (1965) ; State v. Wylie, supra note 33. There is a difference be-
tween requiring a clear intent and strict construction of statutes which clearly intend to
remove a common law right The latter rule has been erased in North Dakota by N. D.
CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (1960).
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words of the statute will be modified by the intent of the
legislature.50
Since the background of the statute which could be construed to cut
down the right to a co-employee suit51 indicates that the legislature
may not have intended that result at all, but merely wished to come
under the rule of the Magnolia decision, and went too far in copying
the Texas statutes quoted by the three cases involved, 52 a court
could allow the suit in spite of the statutory language.
On the other hand, the court could reasonably say that they are
bound by the language in the section on employer's liability and
cannot allow the suit.
5 3
In short, a North Dakota court may probably allow a suit against
a co-employee if it wishes to do so. Whether the allowance of such
a suit is a desirable result is a question which requires an examina-
tion of the purpose of workmen's compensation laws and the results
which follow if an injured employee is not allowed to sue his negli-
gent fellow servant, but is restricted to his workmen's compensation
claim.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION POLICY
Prior to the enactment of workmen's compensation laws, the
employee who was injured on the job faced a usually impossible
problem in attempting to recover compensation from the employer
for his injury. His employer had available to him three common
law defenses-the fellow servant rule, contributory negligence, and
assumption of risk. These defenses together with the cost of litigation
prevented an employee from successfully suing his employer in
almost every situation. Most of those who received any compensation
at all were forced to settle out of court for woefully inadequate
amounts and were threatened with loss of their jobs if they insisted
upon their day in court.5 4 In addition to the difficulty of bringing
suit when they were injured, workmen were largely unable to
obtain preventive relief against unsafe working conditions. 55
With the full impact of the industrial revolution, injuries to
workmen became more common. As a result, it became necessary
to provide some system whereby the industrial worker could be
certain of compensation if he were injured on the job. Workmen's
compensation was developed as a statutory scheme to provide sure
compensation for such injuries regardless of where the fault lay.58
50. State v. Wylie, supra note 33.
51. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960).
52. Supra notes 11 & 12.
53. See Saala v. McFarland, 45 Cal. App. 120, 403 P.2d 400 (1965) ; Sergeant v. Ken-
nedy, 352 Mich. 494, 90 N.W.2d 447 (1958).
54. An estimated 80% of industrial accidents resulted in no compensation at all, while
lawyer's and doctor's fees ate up a substantial portion of the remaining 20%. HOROVITZ,
TRENDS 467. See also LANG, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE 4, 5 (1947).
55. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 59 (1917).
56. Horovltz, Workmen's Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41 Neb.
L. Rev. 1 (1961).
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The fund from which the injured workers were to be paid was
established by requiring the employers to procure some type of
insurance either through private insurance or a state workmen's
compensation fund to which the employer was required to contri-
bute. In return, the employer's liability to common law suit was
eliminated.25 This exchange has been called an enforced bargain
between the employer and the employee.58
The result of applying the bargain, or quid pro quo theory to
the question of whether an injured employee can sue his negligent
fellow servant depends upon how the status of the co-employee is
conceptualized into the bargain scheme. He may be considered to
be outside the bargain. If so, then he has given up nothing to his
injured fellow servant, is not required to pay for his insurance and
therefore should not be allowed the benefit of immunity from suit.59
On the other hand, each employee may be considered to have been
granted both his right to a statutory recovery and an immunity
from suit for injuries arising within the work situation in return
for his right to bring a common law suit should he suffer an
industrial injury.60
Another consideration in determining whether the co-employee
suit should be allowed is whether the immunity from suit will lead
to an increase in on-the-job negligence toward the safety of a fellow
worker. Many appear to think that this result would follow.61 But
many of the accidents do not involve fault, in a moral sense.62 Thus,
it is reasonable to say that the preventive influence of tort liability
will not increase safety in many instances.
Since no fault is involved, the typical industrial accident may
be treated as a statistical inevitability of the industry, the burden
of which should be borne by the industry63 and, ultimately, by
the consumers of the industry's products6"' or by society as a whole.65
A corollary of this theory is that the co-employee, who could be found
liable at common law, has been placed in a situation in which there
57. It is not entirely beside the point to note that under the Swedish workmen's com-
pensation system, the employer may still be sued at common law. The amount of the
workmen's compensation benefit is deducted from the recovery at law. In this way, the
employee may be compensated for non-economic losses such as pain and suffering. AARON
& MATHEWS, EMPLOYMENT RELATION AND THE LAW 185 (1957).
58. Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 161 (1962).
59. Frantz v. McBee Co., 77 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1955): Jones v. Florida Power Corp., 72
So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954); Vidrine v. Solleau, 214 La. 465, 38 So.2d 77 (1948) ; Hockett v.
Chapman, 69 N. Mex. 324, 366 P.2d 850, (1961) ; Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 Ail. 130
(1929) ; Botthof v. Fenske, 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935) ; 16 NACCA L.J. 180, 181 (1955).
60. Thomas v. George Hyman Const. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959); Groves v
Marvel, - Del. -, 213 A.2d 853 (1965).
61. See, e.g., Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856 (1949) ; Botthof v.
Penske, supra note 59; Tawney v. Klrkhart, 130 W.Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 634 (1947); 16
NACCA L.J., supra note 59.
62. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 740, 741 (1956); MILLIS & MONTGOMERY,
LABOR'S RISK AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 198 (1938).
63. Rylander v. Chicago Short Line Ry. Co., 17 Ill.2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812 (1959)
Fettig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946) ; HOROVITZ, TRENDS 469.
64. Thomas v. George Hyman Const., supra note 60; Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney,
102 F.2d 464, 465 (2nd Cir. 1939) ; HOROVITZ, TRENDS 469.
65. The realization of the assumption that the risks of an industrial society should be
widely distributed has been compared to a pickpocket who hears a moving sermon and
picks the pockets of the congregation to put into the collection plate. POUND, SOCIAL CON-
TROL THROUGH LAW 117 (1942).
NoTEs
is a high likelihood that he will do some act which will result in
injury to his fellow employee. Because he normally has little control
over the circumstances of his employment, it is the industry and
not he which should bear the liability for such an act.66 However,
this argument would seem to cut two ways. If the negligent employee
has no control over the work situation in which he is placed, there
is no reason to suppose that the injured co-worker has any greater
control. The injured worker cannot choose the persons beside whom
he must work and upon whom his safety depends. Although normally
free from moral fault,67 a small portion of the working population
Is "accident prone" and are involved in a disproportionate number
of accidents on the job.68 This accident propensity is largely unrelat-
ed to intelligence and may stem from some psychopathic disturbance
within this type of worker. 9 While an element of unfairness may
be present in requiring such people to incur legal liability for actions
which entail no moral wrong, it would appear to be at least as
unfair to cast the financial responsibility for the actions of such
people upon their injured co-workers who are equally free from
moral guilt and who, moreover, have not caused the accident.7 0 To
the extent that under the current workmen's compensation realities,
the burden of industrial injury is cast upon society, it may be
justifiable to remove that burden from the "accident prone" worker,
but to the extent that the burden of the injury is not absorbed
by the industry or by society, it would seem more reasonable to
cast the burden upon the worker causing the accident than upon the
worker who was injured thereby.71
Another theory under which the right to sue a co-employee is
denied is that workmen's compensation is social insurance, the
purpose of which is to distribute the harm involved in industrial
accidents in the manner entailing the least social damage. 72 Since
the negligent co-employee is no more likely to be able to bear the
burden of the accident than the injured employee, it is argued,
there is no reason for society to wish to shift it from the latter to
the former; indeed, to do so results in the damage affecting two
families rather than one.73 If it is accepted that society is bet-
ter off when one innocent employee bears the burden of his
injury alone than when the employee who caused the injury is
66. Crawford v. Parsons, 141 W.Va.,752, 92 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1956) ; 2 LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 174 (1952).
67. ITOROVITZ, TRENDS 469.
68. An estimated 10% of the working population may cause 75% of the Industrial
accidents. 2 HARpER & JAMES, Op. cit. supra note 62, at 734, 735.
69. It may be that such people have a subconscious urge to punishment or self-
destruction. Id at 739.
70. The solution to the accidental Injury problem must satisfy the community's sense
of fair play. Id. at 743.
71. See note 2, supra.
72. Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, supra note 64; 2 HARPER & JAMES, Op. cit supra
note 62, at 763.
73. See McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Lia-
bilities and Rights of Non-Employers. 37 Tex. L. Rev. 389, 446 (1959).
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forced to share a portion of that burden, this arguement may
be unanswerable.
It has also been suggested that to allow an injured employee
to sue his negligent co-employee will result in disharmony between
the industrial workers.74 That an employee will feel more at ease
with his fellows when he knows that if he is injured by one of them
he cannot expect full compensation for his injury may be a ques-
tionable assumption. Moreover, this argument assumes that the
workers are cognizant of their respective tort liabilities during their
relationship with each other. Whether this assumption is warranted
is again debatable. It may well be true that when an employee is
injured by the negligence of his co-employee, some disharmony may
arise between them. How this disharmony is eliminated by preventing
the co-employee suit is less than obvious.
Weighing heavily in favor of allowing the suit of a co-employee
is the basis for the workmen's compensation award. The purpose
of such an award is not to compensate for the injury received, but
to prevent the complete destitution of the injured workman.7 5 Thus,
the employee who is unable to work because of his injury is awarded
only a certain percentage of what he would otherwise have earned. 7
The purpose is to compensate for economic loss and not physical
injury.7
7
This theory means, in application, that only loss of earning
power is compensable under most statutes, and many types of
injuries for which recovery may be had at common law are not
compensable from the workmen's compensation fund. The purpose
is not to restore what has been lost, but to give the claimant a sum
which, when added to his remaining earning capacity will "enable
him to exist without being a burden to others. '78 The loss of sexual
organs79 or sexual powers s" is frequently not compensable. 8 1 And,
if the injured employee's earning power is not thereby impaired,
there is no recovery for pain and suffering. 2 If the injured em-
ployee's only remedy in such cases is a claim under the workmen's
compensation statutes, he will have suffered a loss as a result of
someone else's negligence for which he cannot receive compensation.
On the other hand, if he is allowed to sue his negligent co-employee,
74. O'Brien v. Rautenbush, 10 Ill.2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222, 226 (1956).
75. 1 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 66 § 2.20.
76. See, e.g., Ransom v. Haner, supra note 8, where the workmen's compensation for
total disability was 65% of the injured employee's average wage. See also N. D. CENT.
CODE § 65-05-11 (Supp. 1965) fixing the maximum compensation for total disability at
$50 per week.
77. Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review
of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 57, 81.
78. 1 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 66, § 2.40, 2.50.
79. Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Co., 113 So.2d 742 (Fla. App. 1959); Smith v.
Baker, 157 Okla. 155, 11 P.2d 132 (1932).
80. Hyett v. Northwestern Hospital, 147 Minn. 413, 180 N.W. 552 (1920) ; Stepnowski
V. Specific Pharmaceuticals, 18 N.J. Super. 495, 87 A.2d 546 (1952).
81. Such losses are not included in the schedule of injuries listed at N. D. CENT. COoy §
65-05r13 (1960).
82, Blancett v. Homestake-Sapin Partners, 73 N.M. 47, 385 P.2d 568 (1963).
438
he is compensated as fully as our system of monetary damages
allows.
CONCLUSION
Although it has been said that "forcing the employee to bear a
part of the burden of the economic loss resulting from his injury
not only tends to prevent malingering, but also prevents too great
a cost being placed on the industry,13 there is really no justification,
in choosing who should bear the loss of an industrial injury, for
selecting the injured worker over the worker whose negligent act
caused the injury.
There is some reason in the position that industrial accidents
are an incident of industrial production, the risk of which should
be borne by the industry.8 4 But this is not the choice involved in
deciding whether the co-employee will have to bear the cost of a
significant amount of the injury himself, even if the injury is com-
pensable under workmen's compensation statutes,5 which seldom
keep pace with inflation, 6 and which were planned to give him
only a subsistence income.8 7 If he has certain types of injuries,
he will receive no compensation at all.88
The idea that workmen's compensation is social insurance where-
by the risk of the injury is placed upon the industry or upon society
as a whole is, of course, offended by allowing the co-employee suit.
To the extent that the co-employee can be forced to pay, the risk
is not so distributed. But, neither is the risk distributed when the
burden of the injury must fall in a large part on the injured employee.
When the injured employee is no longer required to carry that
burden under the operation of the workmen's compensation laws,
it will be time to allow the negligent worker his freedom from
responsibility for the injury he has caused. Until the workmen's
compensation laws transfer all of the burden to society, the injured
worker should be able to shift the burden he has through no fault
of his own to the person whose negligence caused the injury. But
the co-worker should not have to assume, in addition, the portion
which society has agreed to bear. In other words, the co-employee
suit should operate differently than the normal suit under the statute
allowing suit against third parties. 9 There should be no subrogation
of the fund to the recovery by the employee and the amount of
83. 22 TEx. CIVIL STATS ANN. XLI (1956) (Clark, Commentary).
84. Supra note 63.
85. See note 2, supra.
86. Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41
Neb. L. Rev. 1, 98 (1961).
87. To allow an injured workman an above-subsistence income, the Bureau of Labor
Standards recommends that a worker with two children be allowed a maximum benefit
equal to 66 2/3% of the state's average weekly wage. Only five states met this require-
ment in 1961. North Dakota was close with 61.5%. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U. S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws: A COMPARISON OF MAJOR PRO-
VISINS WITH RECOMMENDED STANDARDS 34-37 (1961).
88. Supra notes 79 & 80.
89. N. D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (1960).
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the workmen's compensation award should be deducted from the
recovery from the co-employee. This, of course, would require an
amendment to the North Dakota statutes.
Workmen's compensation developed because the injured work-
men did not have adequate means to get compensation under the
common law.90 Its purpose is to give, not to deny, compensation.9
That purpose is not served when it is used to prevent an injured
employee from receiving adequate compensation. Even without the
amendment suggested above, the North Dakota courts should allow
a co-employee suit.
DONALD H. LEONARD
90. Supra note 54.
91. HOROVITZ, TEN DS 476, 477.
